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A CONTRACTARIAN APPROACH TO UNCONSCIONABILITY
HORACIO SPECTOR*

INTRODUCTION

Freedom of contract can be defended on the basis of consequentialist
and nonconsequentialist views. According to the former, individuals can
improve their condition when they are free to exchange goods and services
by making contracts. Improvement of condition can occur by affecting both
the production and the consumption function. First, free exchanges facilitate division of labor and the efficient allocation of the factors of production. Second, because individuals have different utility functions, there is
room for mutually advantageous agreements. Nonconsequentialist views
defend freedom of contract on ethical grounds. So liberalism holds that a
just society must treat individuals as autonomous beings entitled to choose
and do as they see fit provided they do not violate others' rights. One way
of treating individuals in this way is to let them be free to pursue and accomplish associative endeavors for which freedom of contract is often an
indispensable institution.1
Given the strong case for freedom of contract, the burden of proof
falls on any position that purports to restrain its scope. The doctrine of unconscionability authorizes courts to introduce a variety of restrictions on
contractual freedom. Specifically, it allows a court to refuse to enforce
unfair private agreements, and it allows a court to modify the terms of a
contract that the court deems unfair or unreasonable. 2 Arthur Leff introduced a famous distinction between two kinds of unconscionability: proce-

* This paper was presented at the Centre de Recherche en tthique de l'Universit6 de Montreal on
September 23, 2005. 1am grateful to my audience and to my commentator, Catherine Valcke, for helpful
criticism. I also benefited from comments by Alan Brudner, Marcelo Ferrante, Eduardo Rivera-L6pez,
Arthur Ripstein, Gopal Sreenivasan, Luc Tremblay, and Ernie Weinrib.
1. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293
(1975).
2. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). In
civil law jurisdictions, the doctrine of laesio enormis, which is an expansive construal of a remedy in
Roman law, performs basically the same function as the doctrine of unconscionability. See James
Gordley, Contract, Property, and the Will-The Civil Law and Common Law Tradition, in THE STATE
AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 66, 75-76 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998).
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dural and substantive.3 Leff called bargaining naughtiness "procedural
unconscionability," and he used the term "substantive unconscionability" to
refer to "evils" in the resulting contract. 4 Procedural unconscionability
refers to the procedures of contract formation, and particularly, to various
ways in which proper consent may be absent. It therefore comes close to
fraud, mistake, duress, and necessity, which are the classic contract law
defenses. Courts have considered monopoly power, unfair surprise, and
absence of bargaining process (take-it-or-leave-it contracts, standard forms,
etc.) to be causes that can invalidate the contracting process. 5 Substantive
unconscionability refers to unfair, exploitative, or unreasonable contract
terms. For instance, it has been taken to include add-on and waiver-ofdefense clauses, warranty disclaimers, exclusion of liability for consequen6
tial damages, abusive interest rates, and biased labor arbitration terms.
The unconscionability doctrine allows courts to deny enforceability of
unconscionable contracts or to modify unconscionable contracts' terms.
Courts' abilities under this doctrine can be described in terms of the influential distinction between protection of entitlements by a property rule and
by a liability rule, drawn by Calabresi and Melamed. 7 As is well known,
while a property rule protects a given entitlement by means of an injunction
remedy, a liability rule authorizes the court to fix monetary compensation
when the entitlement has been violated. Richard Craswell has applied this
distinction to the entitlements established by the doctrine of unconscionability. 8 Clearly the point of the doctrine is to award contracting parties
entitlement against unconscionable advantage-taking. When X tries to take
unfair advantage of Y in a contract setting, Y's entitlement can be protected
by a property rule or by a liability rule. In the former case, the court will
plainly reject the enforceability of the contract; in the latter, the court will
award damages by adjusting the price of the contract (e.g., diminishing the
interest rate of a loan).
Conjoining the distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability, and the division between protection by a property rule and by
3. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).
4. Id.
5. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 294; see also Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive
Unconscionability,63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (1977).
6. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, UnconscionabilityDoctrine, and Accommodation,
29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 205-06 (2000).
7. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092-93, 1106-10 (1972).
8. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionabilityand Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1993).
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a liability rule, we obtain the four non-exclusive forms of the doctrine
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Forms of the Unconscionability Doctrine
Unconscionability entitlements

Substantive

Procedural

Protection by
property rule

1. Substantive entitlement
protected by injunction

3. Procedural entitlement
protected by injunction

Protection by
liability rule

2. Substantive entitlement
protected by damages

4. Procedural entitlement
protected by damages

Paternalism is the most common defense of the doctrine of unconscionability. Indeed, philosophers who discuss paternalism often give unconscionability as an example of paternalistic measures. 9 On this view, the
doctrine involves a cluster of paternalistic restraints on freedom of contract.
According to Joel Feinberg, "the principle of legal paternalism justifies
state coercion to protect individuals from self-inflicted harm or, in its extreme version, to guide them, whether they like it or not, toward their own
good." 10 This definition is not particularly useful to describe paternalism in
contract law. While paternalism in criminal law forbids agents to commit
self-damaging acts, contract law paternalism characteristically refuses to
enforce contracts that are harmful to one of the parties. The former fits very
well with Feinberg's definition, but the latter requires a broader definition.
In fact, when the state applies the doctrine of unconscionability it often
does not exert coercion but rather refuses to use it to enforce a contract.
Specifically, state coercion is absent in forms 1 and 3 of unconscionability
entitlements.
Seana Shiffrin has provided a definition of paternalism that is more
adequate to frame the paternalistic account of unconscionability. She understands paternalism by A toward B as
behavior (whether through action or through omission) (a) aimed to have
(or to avoid) an effect on B or her sphere of legitimate agency (b) that
involves the substitution of A's judgment or agency for B's (c) directed
at B's own interests or matters that legitimately lie within B's control (d)
undertaken on the grounds that compared to B's judgment or agency
9. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 3, 11-17 (Rolf Sartorius ed.,
1983); see also Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM, supra, at 19, 21-28. While Dworkin
does not use the term "unconscionability" per se, he discusses paternalism as a tool for invalidating
certain types of contracts.
10. Feinberg, supra note 9, at 3.
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with respect to those interests or other matters, A regards her judgment
11
or agency to be (or as likely to be), in some respect, superior to B's.
This definition has one clear advantage over traditional characterizations. As said before, forms 1 and 3 of the unconscionability doctrine do
not involve government's use of coercion, but rather its refusal to use coercion for contract enforcement. Therefore, traditional definitions of paternalism focused on "active" coercive interventions (e.g., Feinberg's definition
quoted above) cannot accommodate "passive" forms of intervention typical
of contract law. Shiffrin's definition covers such "passive" forms because it
allows paternalist behavior to be committed through inaction.
Paternalistic accounts of the unconscionability doctrine are problematic because liberalism is often associated with anti-paternalism. 12 John
Stuart Mill declared that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not
a sufficient warrant." 13 Mill's invective against legal paternalism was so
powerful that contemporary liberal theorists often reject out of hand a paternalist approach to legal institutions. Thus, Shiffrin says that paternalism
"directly expresses insufficient respect for the underlying valuable capacities, powers, and entitlements of the autonomous agent. Those who value
equality and autonomy have special reason to resist paternalism toward
competent adults." 14 Shiffrin's definition of paternalism makes it true by
definition that paternalism is disrespectful of individual autonomy. In effect, condition (d) of Shiffrin's definition says that a government taking a
paternalistic measure must regard its judgment as superior to citizens'
judgments. This is per se insulting and humiliating to autonomous individuals.
My purpose in this paper is to discuss two nonpaternalistic defenses of
the unconscionability doctrine. In the first section, I will discuss Shiffrin's
view, which is premised on self-regarding reasons to refrain from collaborating with people who try to obtain an unfair advantage via a contractual
transaction. I will argue that this view has two main shortcomings. First, it
is irrelevant to procedural unconscionability and to substantive unconscionability protected by a liability rule (forms 2, 3, and 4). Second, though
11. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 218.
12. See, e.g., ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 58 (1974); see also BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12 (1980); Eric Mack, In Defense of the

Jurisdiction Theory of Rights, in RIGHTS, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 71, 72, 84 (Guido Pincione &
Horacio Spector eds., 2000).
13. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprintedin UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, ESSAY
ON BENTHAM, at 135 (Mary Warnock ed., 1962).
14. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 220.
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it is certainly relevant to form 1 (substantive unconscionability protected by
a property rule), it is in the end defective because, except under special
15
conditions, informed and free consent cleanses transactional unfairness
In the second section, I will propose a contractarian approach to unconscionability. I will argue that this approach provides a defense for procedural unconscionability (forms 3 and 4). It can also bolster some forms of
substantive unconscionability (forms 1 and 2). Specifically, it admits "impure substantive unconscionability," which takes inequitable contract terms
as evidence of procedural unconscionability, but rejects "pure substantive
unconscionability," which is independent of any procedural flaw.16
I.

THE SELF-REGARDING APPROACH

Shiffrin proposes a "self-regarding" theory of unconscionability. 17
According to this view, the state, via the courts, should not enforce private
agreements whereby one party exploits or takes unfair advantage of the
other. 18 While the state can legitimately facilitate private agreements by
enforcing contracts, thus deterring contractual breach or remedying its
harmful effects, the state may not assist contracting parties in benefitting
from unfair or exploitative transactions. Shiffrin claims that "refusal to
enforce would only make sense when the content and outcome of the contract were morally objectionable in such a way as to implicate the judge's
and the state's moral stature."' 19 When the state fulfills a moral duty not to
get involved in immorality via the doctrine of unconscionability, it does not
take a paternalist stance. It is worth quoting Shiffrin's clear prose in this
respect:
The refusal to enforce need not represent an effort to supplant the judgment or action of the contracting parties or an intention to stop them
from engaging in (solely) mutually regarding immoral action. (Such ef15. It might also be argued (1) that substantive unconscionability relies on the theory of the "just
price," and (2) that this theory is inconsistent with contemporary economics. I believe this is a weak
argument. It is true that the former claim is plausible. In fact, substantive unconscionability requires
some standard of equality in exchange or bargaining equity. But contemporary economics may allow
some of these standards; for instance, equality in exchange could be associated with competitive market
prices. Some historians of economic thought argue that this was the real meaning of "just price," so the
latter claim is controversial. See James R. Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 160406(1981).
16. Shiffrin uses the label "pure substantive unconscionability" in the same sense. Shiffrin, supra
note 6, at 209.
17. Id.at 227.
18. The view has been insinuated as a theoretical possibility by Joel Feinberg: "One might argue
that what is odious in 'harsh and unconscionable' contracts, even when they are voluntary on both
sides, is not that people should suffer the harm they freely risk, but rather that another party should
'exploit' or take advantage of them." Feinberg, supra note 9, at 13.
19. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 231.
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forts would be paternalist, on my account). Instead, the motive may reasonably be a self-regarding concern
not to facilitate or assist harmful,
20
exploitative, or immoral action.
Shiffrin treats the moral duty not to assist evil transactions as a "side
constraint. '2 1 Thus, she claims that I could refuse-in a nonpaternalist
way-to buy cigarettes for you (a smoker) because "I think that I should
not perform substantial actions that contribute to your addiction or illness."' 22 It is a "side constraint" because it holds even if I can predict that,
as a result of my abstention, someone else will buy more cigarettes for you,
or more pernicious ones. By the same token, the state should withhold its
coercive power to assist parties in enforcing unfair agreements even if the
state could predict that, as a result of its inaction, more citizens will be
victims of unfair actions (perhaps because the state's refusal causes a decline in economic growth). 23 Indeed, Shiffrin endorses a possibly counterproductive policy proposal on nonconsequentialist grounds:
The state has at least a permission and perhaps a deontological commitment not to assist grossly unfair treatment of one of its citizens by another. Even if the abandonment of the unconscionability doctrine would
be more efficient and might enable more generous redistribution, there
would still be reason to refuse to insert
the state's power between citi24
zens to assist exploitative behavior.
As the following sections will reveal, Shiffrin's approach is flawed in two
key respects.
A.

Shortcoming: Irrelevant to ProceduralUnconscionabilityand
Substantive UnconscionabilityProtectedby the Liability Rule

Shiffrin does not consider procedural unconscionability (forms 3 and
4); that is, she does not consider legal defenses to the effect that a contract
is not the outcome of a truly voluntary agreement. She takes this decision
"in part, because disputes about which agreements are truly voluntary often
reach an impasse, and, in part, because there is a distinct defense worth

20. Id. at 224.
21. A "side constraint" is a moral prohibition falling on each individual agent that rules out any
kind of goal-oriented moral reasoning (e.g., welfare maximization). See NOZICK, supra note 12, at 2654. Nozick's work here is the locus classicus for "side constraints" on state action.
22. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 224.
23. Many readers would probably regard this (presumed) consequence as unacceptable, but I will
not press the point. As moral philosophers know very well, downplaying such consequences is a distinctive mark of nonconsequentialism.
24. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 235; see also Guido Pincione & Fernando R. Tes6n, Rational Ignorance and Political Morality, 72 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. (forthcoming Mar. 2006) (an
excellent study of deontological self-defeating proposals like Shiffrin's).
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pursuing. '2 5 Shiffrin's reluctance to resort to a criterion of voluntariness is
understandable in the context of a nonconsequentialist position. In fact,
nonconsequentialist theories tend to run into circularity when their fundamental principles are couched in terms of freedom or voluntariness. Thus,
critics claim that the right to freedom cannot have a foundational role because freedom is a moralized concept and, therefore, the right of freedom
must rely on independent normative principles. 2 6 Similarly, Anthony
Kronman claims that contract law depends on distributive justice because
the concept of voluntariness-essential to contract law postulates-has
little meaning in the absence of independent normative principles ascertaining which forms of advantage-taking are permissible. 27 Thus, I believe that
Shiffrin's reluctance is justified. She could not account for procedural unconscionability without further theoretical resources.
The "distinct defense" Shiffrin is concerned with is pure substantive
unconscionability, which focuses on the contract terms themselves regardless of fairness in contract formation. Shiffrin assumes a "will" theory of
promising, which roughly "holds that promises bind when they are made
by autonomous people under suitable conditions, such that the promise is
the free expression of that person's will."'28 Accordingly, she assumes that
unconscionable contracts "are made voluntarily, by responsible agents, and
'29
under conditions of sufficient information.
Shiffrin is also unable to explain form 2, where the state, via the judiciary, modifies the terms of unconscionable agreements. The self-regarding
theory enjoins nonintervention, that is, refusal to enforce, on the basis of a
general moral duty not to collaborate with the execution of immoral plans.
So understood, the doctrine of unconscionability is not affected by the
charge of paternalism. However, under form 2 the judge must not merely
remain passive, refraining from assisting evildoing. Instead, she must intervene to redress contractual unfairness, even if the contract is procedurally
impeccable-that is, even if the parties have given free and informed con-

25. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 209.
26. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Reiman, The Fallacy of LibertarianCapitalism, 92 ETHICS 85 (1981); G.
A. Cohen, The Structure of ProletarianUnfreedom, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1983); G. A. Cohen, SelfOwnership, World-Ownership, and Equality, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY HERE AND Now 108 (Frank S.

Lucash ed., 1986); David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121 (1981).
27. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and DistributiveJustice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 475-97
(1980).
28. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 209-10.
29. Id. at 209.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 81:95

sent to it. Such interventions typically proceed in the way of takings at
"administrative," noncontractual prices. 30
The inability to account for form 2 may not be a major problem for
Shiffrin, as she also leaves this form out of her discussion:
The unconscionability doctrine, famously, operates as a shield and not as
a sword. One may protect oneself against enforcement of an unconscionable contract, but one may not obtain damages for having been subject to
an unconscionable offer; nor may
one seek restitution for compliance
31
with an unconscionable contract.

However, it is instructive to linger over the question of why the selfregarding theory cannot justify judicial intervention in form 2 without sliding into some form of paternalism. As we saw above, for Shiffrin the con32
ditions of paternalist behavior might be true of an action or an omission.
One might think that self-regarding behaviors might also be actions or
omissions. Suppose then that a judge intervenes to adjust the price of a
contract by reasoning that the state has a duty to actively thwart parties'
plans when these plans, if left undisturbed, would violate equality of condition. Moreover, suppose that when the judge is asked about her motives,
she makes it clear that she is guided by a self-centered moral reason not to
let an exploitative or unfair plan succeed. Does this make sense? Does not
the judge's behavior look like a form of moral paternalism?
The possibility for the state to take active intervention in a private
transaction on nonpaternalist, self-regarding motivations depends on how
we demarcate the boundaries of each agent's moral jurisdiction. Shiffrin
concedes that "a full account of paternalism will depend on an account of
what sorts of interests and matters legitimately lie within an agent's control." 3 3 Two alternatives emerge: either the contract lies within the state's
legitimate area of agency and judgment, or the contract lies within the parties' control. If the former holds-that is, if parties' transactions lie within
the state's control-the possibility of paternalist behavior vanishes because
every conceivable instance of paternalist intervention in private transactions could be vindicated on the grounds of a morally guided self-regarding
motivation. So to preserve the distinction that Shiffrin holds between pater-

30. Occasionally a court may refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract unless the parties are
prepared to agree on a reform the court proposes to them. These cases of weak judicial intervention do
not really fall under form 2 of unconscionability because the court does not refashion the contract in a
compulsory way. Instead, the judge's offer to enforce the refashioned contract is a sort of noncompulsory mediation. The rationale of noncompulsory mediation should be searched for in transaction costs
reduction; in any event, it is alien to unconscionability concerns.
31. Id. at 229.
32. Id. at 218.
33. Id.
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nalist and self-regarding behavior, we must assume that the parties' jurisdiction encompasses the contract. However, if the latter alternative is true,
the judge cannot possibly be guided by a merely self-centered, nonpaternalist concern because her intervention involves exercising moral judgment on
a matter that lies within the parties' control. In contrast, when the judge
merely refuses to enforce the contract (form I of unconscionability), "[s]he
legitimately exercises moral judgment about herself and her range of activity."' 34 This asymmetry between intervention and nonintervention holds
because the distinction between self-regarding and paternalistic motivations
is conditional on autonomy rights. Basically, a nonpaternalist, purely selfregarding motivation to take action on matters that lie within someone
else's control is an oxymoron. But a self-regarding, nonpaternalist motivation not to collaborate in matters lying within someone else's jurisdiction is
always possible.
B.

Relevant to Form 1 but Defective Because Consent Removes the
Unfairness

Does Shiffrin's self-regarding rationale really apply to form 1 of unconscionability, particularly to cases of pure substantive unconscionability,
where fraud, coercion, necessity, and other procedural vices are ex hypothesi absent? Because procedurally perfect agreements are the free expression of the parties' will, it is difficult to see how the content of these
agreements could be unfair or inequitable. In fact, according to the maxim
"volenti non fit injuria" (to one who consents no harm is done), acts that
would otherwise be impermissible infringe no right when the right holder
gives free and informed consent, for instance via a well-formed contract. 35
Shiffrin does not spell out a theory of transactional unfairness, so a conclusive assessment of her view is difficult. Shiffrin might certainly reject the
maxim "volenti non fit injuria." However, according to most plausible
moral theories, if a contract has been formed with free and informed consent, in principle its terms cannot be taken to be unfair or exploitative. This
means that, unless a special argument is offered, substantive unconscionability must be considered of the impure or evidentiary variety; grossly
inequitable terms can show that contract formation has been vitiated by a
procedural defect.
34. Id. at 226.
35. See Feinberg, supra note 9, at 4-5. Please note that as the journal editors were revising the last
version of this paper, I came across an article relevant to this discussion. While the authors make a similar
polemical point, their brief defense of unconscionability, which is based on Rawls's two principles of
justice, strikingly differs from the contractarian argument discussed in this paper. See Kevin A. Kordana
& David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598 (2005).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 81:95

Shiffrin assumes that substantive unfairness is compatible with free
and informed consent. 36 As discussed above, this assumption is controversial. 37 Yet there is one natural grounding of this assumption that Shiffrin
does not explore. Procedurally perfect agreements could be unfair if they
sought to transfer nonwaivable, inalienable rights. In fact, the connection
between unconscionability and inalienability is straightforward. Thus,
Hegel treated a sale on inalienable goods as a limit case of laesio
enormis. 38 In a similar vein, Shiffrin could claim that contracts seeking to
transfer inalienable rights are substantively unconscionable, even if they
had been formed via unobjectionable procedures. Because in such cases the
volenti maxim would not hold, Shiffrin could claim that the state would be
morally implicated if it enforced contracts that violated inalienable rights
(e.g., a right to a fair deal). This strategy would be exposed, however, to
two serious problems. First, inalienability can hardly be disengaged from
paternalism in the context of nonconsequentialist theories. Preventing individuals from relinquishing or transferring their rights seems "directed at
matters that legitimately lie within their control." If Shiffrin availed herself
of this strategy to bolster substantive unfairness, she would commit herself
to a paternalist defense of unconscionability, the very defense she wants to
avoid. Second, inalienable rights are surely exceptional in liberal theory.
Even if the self-regarding theory could explain form 1 of unconscionability
on the basis of nonwaivable rights, the theory would only cover very few
cases. In fact, free and voluntary exchanges over the vast majority of liberal
rights would still be unobjectionable on the grounds of unconscionability or
unfairness.
Shiffrin's denial that free and informed consent removes a transaction's unfairness is not sufficient for her argument to work. She must also
hold that free and informed consent does not release a third party from
moral responsibility in assisting the transaction. However, there is an indication that Shiffrin believes that a third party who aids an exploitative
transaction need not be morally implicated when the exploited party has
consented to the transaction. In fact, she describes a hypothetical she calls
"Supererogatory Refusal for B's Benefit" thus:
A and B ask C to assist them in their endeavor, claiming that C's participation is essential. C believes that the deal treats B unfairly but, given
B's consent, C does not think that her participation will morally implicate C in the unfairness. Rather, moral responsibility for A's exploitative
36. See Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 209.
37. See supra text accompanying note 26.
38. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 107 (Allen W. Wood ed., H. B.

Nisbet trans., 1991) (1820).

2006]

A CONTRA CTA RIA N A PPROA CH TO UNCONSCIONA BILITY

behavior lies with A alone. C refuses to help anyway, out of concern for
B, but not because C believes that facilitation would be
morally wrong or
39
that he has a duty not to. C simply wants to protect B.
Shiffrin contrasts this case with another she calls "Self-Regarding Refusal," where C declines her intervention on moral grounds:
A and B ask C to assist them in their endeavor, claiming that C's participation is essential. C believes the deal treats B unfairly and that A is taking advantage of B. C refuses to help on the grounds that assistance
would implicate C in the exploitation. C refuses to direct her energies to
facilitating an exploitative relationship, believing it both to be immoral
to facilitate and an unworthy investment of time and energy, especially
40
given her other commitments and ideals.
Shiffrin claims that, while Supererogatory Refusal involves paternalism, Self-Regarding Refusal does not. The alleged reason is that in SelfRegarding Refusal C decides not to assist on a self-regarding moral motivation not to collaborate with A's wronging B. But in framing Supererogatory
Refusal Shiffrin insinuates that B's consent may wipe out C's moral responsibility in assisting A and B to carry out their endeavor (Shiffrin seems
to say that consent may remove C's, but not A's moral responsibility in an
unfair transaction). Now B's consent is by hypothesi also present in SelfRegarding Refusal because this situation models agreements affected by
pure substantive unconscionability, that is, free from procedural unconscionability. In regard to such agreements, "given the parties' consent," the
judge might also not be morally implicated in the transaction if she participated by enforcing the contract. But then, if the judge were not morally
implicated in the transaction, she should enforce the contract on the basis of
an underlying moral or institutional duty to enforce contracts. My point is
that, even if the parties' consent could not make an exploitative or unfair
agreement morally permissible, it could preempt the judge's moral responsibility in assisting them (in the absence of other moral objections). Because Shiffrin does not rule out this possibility, the self-regarding rationale
lies on shaky foundations.

II.

THE CONTRACTARIAN APPROACH

Unconscionability and other measures associated with paternalism are
often seen as inimical to individual autonomy and free choice. However, at
least since Mill, social theorists have been aware that some forms of pater-

39. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 227 (emphasis added).
40. Id.
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nalism can be reconciled with the principle of free choice. 4 1 For instance,
Mill claims that some kinds of government interference with individuals'
choices are taken for the individuals' good without detriment to individual
liberty. 42 Maximum-hours legislation is one example. Mill says that such
measures are "required, not to overrule the judgment of individuals respecting their own interest, but to give effect to that judgment; they being unable
to give effect to it except by concert, which concert again cannot be effectual unless it receives validity and sanction from the law."'4 3 In contemporary economic jargon, such interventions are addressed to avoid collective
action problems. Such problems typically arise in prisoner's dilemma situa44
tions.
Government interventions addressed to correct disharmonies between
individual and collective rationality in prisoner's dilemma situations do not
convey an insulting or humiliating message. When government compels an
individual to follow an efficiency-enhancing rule, it does not say, "My
judgment is superior to yours," but rather something like, "According to
widely accepted social science, in the absence of government intervention
individual rational agents will follow strategies that impair their individual
preferences as they see them." It is not on the assumption of irrationality or
lack of competence that government takes these measures, but rather on the
assumption that individuals are fully rational.Simply because individuals
act in accordance with the postulates of individual rationality, they will
sometimes fail to achieve those outcomes that are rational from a collective
perspective.
A.

Paternalismand IndividualizedHypothetical Consent

Mill's view of justifiable paternalism relies on a mismatch between
individual and group rationality, but a generalized argument based on the
limitations of human rationality might ground other benign forms of paternalism. Gerald Dworkin famously suggested that "paternalistic" interventions can be defended on the basis of systematic limitations of our

41. See, e.g., DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS ON
BENEVOLENCE (1986).
42.

JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES

OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

575-91

(London, Longmans,

Green, and Co. 1894).

43. Id. at 581.
44. The literature on the prisoner's dilemma is copious. See, e.g., DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY
(1986); GREGORY S. KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 109-10
DAVID SCHMIDTZ, THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE PUBLIC GOODS

AGREEMENT

(1986);

ARGUMENT 55 (1991); see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968).
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cognitive and emotional capacities. He gives the example of Odysseus's
choice to be tied to the mast, which was based on his prediction that he
would otherwise yield to the Sirens' singing.4 5 We can contrast Dworkin's
view with Mill's by using economic notions. While Mill was concerned
about prisoner's dilemma failures of individual rationality, Dworkin seeks
to ground some paternalist interventions on what Herbert Simon termed
"bounded rationality."' 46 Like Mill's view, Dworkin's account of paternalism is not inconsistent with the principles of liberalism because it appeals
to consent: "Under certain conditions, it is rational for individuals to agree
that others should force them to act in ways that, at the time of action, the
individuals may not see as desirable. '4 7 Dworkin suggests a "hypothetical
consent" test to evaluate "paternalist" interferences:
I suggest that since we are all aware of our irrational propensitiesdeficiencies in cognitive and emotional capacities and avoidable and unavoidable ignorance-it is rational and prudent for us to take out "social
insurance policies." We may argue for and against proposed paternalistic
of what fully rational individuals would accept as
measures in terms 48
forms of protection.
Dworkin's test relies on "individualized hypothetical consent." 49 What
the test requires is a counterfactual inquiry about what the interfered-with
agent would have consented to. One difficult issue is to select the group of
choices on which paternalistic restrictions can be justified by appealing to
hypothetical rational consent: "I suggest we think of the imposition of paternalistic interferences in situations of this kind as being a kind of insurance policy that we take out against making decisions that are far-reaching,
'50
potentially dangerous, and irreversible."
Dworkin's defense of paternalism does not oppose autonomous
choices. On the contrary, hypothetical rational consent would only sanction
autonomy-enhancing restrictions: "I suggest that we would be most likely
to consent to paternalism in those instances in which it preserves and enhances for individuals their ability to rationally consider and carry out their
'5 1
own decisions.

45. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 29.
46. Herbert A. Simon, Bounded Rationality, in [I A to D] THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY
eds., 1987).
OF ECONOMICS 266, 266-68 (John Eatwell et al.
47. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 29.
48. Id.
49. 1 borrow the label from Donald VanDeVeer. VANDEVEER, supra note 41, at 75 (discussing
"hypothetical individualized consent").
50. Dworkin, supra note 9, at31.
51. Id. at 33.
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Whatever the merits of the individualized hypothetical consent position regarding paternalism, it is an inadequate basis for the unconscionability doctrine. There are three reasons for this. First, the typical form of the
individualized hypothetical consent view subordinates the legitimacy of a
paternalistic interference to what the agent would have agreed to immediately before the interference. The application of this view to the doctrine of
unconscionability has special difficulties. Unlike paternalist interventions
in criminal or regulatory law, the doctrine of unconscionability typically
affects two agents (i.e., the promisor and the promisee). Suppose we want
to establish whether a certain nullification on the grounds of unconscionability is justifiable. The individualized hypothetical consent view suggests
testing counterfactual consent of each party at a moment immediately before the contract. This counterfactual test will generally yield predictably
conflicting results. While the promisor would surely have agreed to the
court's paternalistic interference, the promisee might have strongly opposed to it. Because unconscionability curbs both parties' contractual freedom, we have no reason to privilege one party's hypothetical choice to the
detriment of the other's. Against this background, how can we settle the
dispute?
Second, the doctrine of unconscionability involves not only particular
interferences with an agent's contractual liberty but also wide-ranging institutional choices (e.g., empowering courts to nullify contracts) and a vast
array of causal effects (e.g., price adjustments). If our counterfactual test is
couched in terms of an agent's consent to a particular act of paternalistic
interference, all these complexities get neglected. What we need is a perspective from which we can assess whether a social policy of interference
can achieve a certain goal. The perspective suggested by the individualized
hypothetical consent view is too narrow. Therefore, our approach should be
rule-oriented, rather than focused on particular acts.
Finally, a rational person could allow the state to interfere with her
less-than-voluntary choices. To this effect she should follow certain criteria
indicating when a choice is not fully voluntary. Indeed, rational hypothetical consent, no less than rational actual consent, must follow certain rules
or criteria. One obvious possibility for a rational person is to adopt the legal
standard of voluntariness. Procedural unconscionability might be warranted
in this way. But, as we saw above, voluntariness is a normative notion. 52
As Kronman argues, there is no factual basis for deciding that, for instance,
force excludes voluntariness but fraud is consistent with it. 53 Moreover, a
52. See supra text accompanying note 26.
53. See Kronman, supra note 27, at 475-78.
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mere appeal to abstract notions of rights or liberty would not suffice because such notions are also reliant on normative principles. As Kronman
remarks,
[W]e cannot say whether the liberty principle is violated if one person
takes advantage of another by concealing valuable information in the
course of an exchange, unless we have already decided that it is part of
the first person's liberty that he be allowed to exploit the information he
possesses in this way and not 54
a part of the other person's liberty that he
be free from such exploitation.
Therefore, an additional problem of the individualized hypothetical consent
view is that it lacks theoretical resources for establishing a principle capable of drawing a line between voluntary and involuntary agreements.
B.

The Core of the ContractarianAccount

The rejection of individualized hypothetical consent naturally leads to
a search for other consent-based views of the unconscionability doctrine.
Specifically, I submit that the unconscionability doctrine should be understood along contractarian lines, rather than in terms of individualized hypothetical consent. This view accords well with John Rawls's brief treatment
of paternalism. 55 Rawls trades on Gerald Dworkin's view of paternalism as
an insurance to suggest a contractarian reading of paternalist interventions.
Thus, he maintains that "the principles of paternalism are those that the
parties would acknowledge in the original position to protect themselves
''56
against the weakness and infirmities of their reason and will in society.
However, I will not resort to Rawls's own premises, or to any other contractarian theory in particular. 5 7 Instead, my reasoning will be premised on
an "ecumenical" contractarian/contractualist position that differentiates two
levels of choice: constitutionalchoice and sub-constitutional(or in-period)
choice.58 At the constitutional level, fundamental principles or rules for
coordination and (fair) cooperation are selected. At the sub-constitutional
level, individuals make particular transactions. Unlike the individualized
hypothetical consent view, this approach is oriented to principles and rules.
54. Id. at 483.
55.

Rawls dedicates three paragraphs to this issue. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 248-

50(1971).
56. Id. at 249.
57. I do not set great store by the distinction between contractarianism and contractualism. The
reader, however, may find helpful to know that I have in mind, apart from Rawls's work, the following
pieces of contractarian/contractualist literature: JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, TIlE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (Liberty Fund, Inc., 1999)
(1962); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN (1975);

Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).
58. VIKTOR J. VANBERG, RULES AND CHOICE IN ECONOMICS 218 (1994).
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This "ecumenical" view-I will also assume-insists that people have a
right to dispose of their just holdings by contract. Most contractarian/contractualist theories accord with this assumption. 59 For instance,
James Buchanan and Loren Lomasky say that contractors will require "that
all persons be free to enter and to exit from private contracts, to make voluntary exchanges without collective constraint, and to enter any occupational category." 6 0 Much the same is true of Ronald Dworkin's theory of
equality of resources. Dworkin says "that the idea of an economic market,
as a device for setting prices for a vast variety of goods and services, must
be at the center of any attractive theoretical development of equality of
resources. ' 6 1 In fact, Dworkin's egalitarian initial auction allocates private
property rights, which the just owner can relinquish or transfer. Moreover,
when Dworkin discusses the place of liberty in his theory of justice, he
defends a "principle of abstraction," which "establishes a strong presumption in favor of freedom of choice.

' 62

Contractarianism can cope with the three difficulties that motivated
our rejection of the individualized hypothetical view. First, it does not
evaluate particular interferences with freedom of contract, but rather it
evaluates principles or rules of contract regulation. For example, contractarianism must compare unhampered freedom of contract and a system of
freedom of contract qualified by procedural unconscionability. Therefore,
contractors are distanced from the particular positions they will or might
occupy as a result of the operation of contract rules. Buchanan and Vanberg
state the connection between generality and impartiality in concise terms:
The more general rules are and the longer the period over which they are
expected to be in effect, the less certain persons can be about the particular ways in which alternative rules will affect them. They will therefore
be induced to adopt a more impartial perspective and, consequently, they

will be more likely to reach agreement. 63

59. The proposition has one important qualification because Rawls's theory is in this regard
ambiguous. On the one hand, Rawls leaves the choosing of a property regime at the original position as
an open question. However, Loren Lomasky has persuasively argued that Rawlsian contractors would
adopt a private property regime. See Loren E. Lomasky, Libertarianismat Twin Harvard,22 SOC. PHIL.
& POL'Y 178 (2005). On the other hand, Rawls seems to endorse freedom of contract in placing contract law outside the realm of the basic structure. See Liam B. Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of
Justice, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 258 (1998).

60. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & LOREN E. LOMASKY, The Matrix of ContractarianJustice, in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN: MORAL SCIENCE AND MORAL ORDER 379, 402 (Liberty

Fund, Inc. 2001) (1999).
61. Dworkin, supra note 57, at 284.
62. Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1, 25
(1987).
63.

VANBERG,supra note 58, at 171.
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Sometimes contractarians use the more direct expedient of placing a
veil of ignorance or uncertainty over the contractors at the constitutional
choice. In any case, contractarianism is apt to do away with the discrepancy
between the promisor and the promisee that threatened the individualized
consent view.
Second, parties at the constitutional choice must consider social policies and their associated institutional rules. According to contractarians,
constitutional consent involves a complex decision-making process. Instead
of considering rules on a case-by-case basis, they discuss the overall effects
of rules. To this effect, the parties are assumed to possess all relevant
knowledge in psychology, economics, and social theory. Thus, they know
what effects various institutional arrangements will have in practice.
Among other things, contractors will discuss possible side-effects of various powers awarded to government and the courts.
Finally, at the constitutional choice contractors do not consider the
doctrine of unconscionability in isolation but consider it along with other
fundamental principles of contract law. Thus, they must lay down rules that
define voluntariness in exchange; that is, they must lay down rules that
establish which constraints are consistent with voluntariness in subconstitutional or in-period choices. 64 Because such rules must be justified
by voluntary choice at the constitutional level, mutuality of advantage constrains the possible outcomes. For instance, parties at the constitutional
level could only allow a particular form of advantage-taking if it works "to
the long-run benefit of those disadvantaged by it," or "to the benefit of all
concerned. ' 65 While a purely procedural criterion could run into an infinite
regress, a "reflective equilibrium" or "multilevel, conjectural" approach,
combining procedural and substantive elements, can produce a meaningful
notion of voluntariness that serves to support the whole structure. 66 The
contractarian approach assumes that voluntariness at the constitutional
choice can be more easily assessed by substantive criteria. For instance,
low exit costs from a collective arrangement characteristically indicate free
choice. From a contractarian perspective, a non-arbitrary line between voluntary and involuntary agreements can be drawn. 67

64. See id. at 209-11.
65. Kronman, supra note 27, at 486-88 (discussing the concept of paretianism and comparing it to
utilitarianism).
66. See RAWLS, supra note 55, at 48-51; VANBERG, supra note 58, at 226.
67. This opens a way out of the impasse Shiffrin is worried about. See supra text accompanying
note 26.
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How the Contractors Choose a Narrow Interpretationof the
UnconscionabilityDoctrine

How would the contractors proceed to design the rules of contract law,
and, in particular, a doctrine of unconscionability? We have assumed that
contractors choose a basic regime of freely transferable property rights.
However, as we saw above, contractors must draw a line between voluntary
and involuntary agreements. Therefore, they will complement a principle of
free alienation of rights with, for instance, the defenses of incompetence,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, and necessity (it is assumed here that
these defenses serve a mutual advantage). Once the standard of voluntariness is set in this way, contractors might consider-in accordance with
Gerald Dworkin's suggestion-taking out an insurance policy against "potentially dangerous" less-than-voluntary agreements. They will make this
decision if they calculate that the traditional defenses do not provide sufficient protection. Because such defenses are often difficult to prove, contractors might avail themselves of a doctrine of unconscionability to deter
fraud and deceit in a cost-effective way (e.g., avoiding prohibitive evidence
costs). 68 Thus, the doctrine might be used to neutralize or ameliorate the
deleterious effects of less-than-voluntary, sub-constitutional transactions. A
doctrine of procedural unconscionability is a natural supplement to the
traditional defenses because it presumes nonvoluntariness when contract
formation has been vitiated by certain procedural defects. But impure substantive unconscionability could also work as a cost-avoiding presumption
because some agreements are so harsh that no competent, informed, and
fully rational person would have consented to them.
Parties at the constitutional choice will try by all means to protect
freedom of choice. Thus, contractarianism is inimical to strong paternalism. 69 This is not inconsistent with endorsing a doctrine of unconscionability at the constitutional level. A self-protection against nonvoluntary
agreements is not strongly paternalist. Feinberg makes this point very persuasively:

68. Epstein, supra note 1, at 301-05. Kronman makes a similar point with respect to the warranty
of habitability in residential leases. He regards it as a fraud protection rule grounded on efficiency
reasons. If the warranty were a disclaimable default rule, the tenant could waive it and still remain
protected by the general remedy of fraud. But the proof of fraud is often difficult and expensive to
produce. So if the warranty were waivable, the courts could consider many fraudulent leases valid and
society would have to endure a serious welfare loss. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalismand the
Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 766-74 (1983).
69. See RAWLS, supra note 55, at 248-50; see also BUCHANAN & LOMASKY, supra note 60; JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 257-85 (1993).
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The central thesis of John Stuart Mill and other individualists about paternalism is that the fully voluntary choice or consent of a mature and rational human being concerning matters that affect only the individual's
own interests is such a precious thing that no one else (and certainly not
the state) has a right to interfere with it simply for the person's "own
70
good."
This allows interventions with (potentially) self-damaging behaviors
that result from less than fully voluntary choice. Among these interventions
are procedural unconscionability and impure substantive unconscionability,
as defended above. According to Feinberg, "people can rightly be prevented from harming themselves (when other interests are not directly involved) only if their intended action is substantially nonvoluntary or can be
presumed to be so in the absence of evidence to the contrary." 7' While
Feinberg calls these policies "weak paternalism," I contend that they should
not count as paternalism at all because they do not meet conditions (b) and
(d) of Shiffrin's definition. In effect, it is the contractors' choice that lies at
the bottom of the doctrine, and therefore, its application does not involve
the substitution of the court's judgment or agency for the contracting parties' judgment. Nor is the doctrine applied on the grounds that the court
regards its judgment or agency to be, in some respect, superior to the parties' judgment. Instead, the doctrine is applied on the grounds that, via the
contractarian technique, the parties can be assumed to have consented to
this "intervention."
Setting the precise contours of the doctrine of unconscionability involves a complex contractarian reasoning. Contractors know that the transfer of property rights constitutes an essential ingredient of their ability to
pursue various plans of life. But they are also aware of their risk of making
nonvoluntary agreements because of misinformation, cognitive deficiencies, irrational calculations, and so on. What kind of insurance policy will
contractors take out? Contractors should weigh the importance of free
choice and the risks of self-damaging nonvoluntary agreements. Some authors suggest that state interventions in this field should be widespread and
coercive. For instance, Duncan Kennedy defends a very intrusive paternalist policy in contract law. 72 For Kennedy, compulsory terms can cure "false
consciousness," which covers such differing things as underestimation of
risk, augmentation of the discount rate, unsupported confidence in others'
future behavior, and erroneous appreciation of long-term consequences of

70. Feinberg, supra note 9, at 8 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
72. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982).
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submissive relationships. 73 Kennedy claims, "Courts using the doctrine of
unconscionability like to put their decisions on grounds of unequal bargaining power. . . . But it's often obvious that they are concerned not with
power but with naivet6, or with lack of ability to make intelligent calculations about what one can afford on one's budget. '74 In these cases, "the
decision maker has to take the beneficiary under his wing and tell him what
75
he can and cannot do."
Paternalism has received new impetus from research in behavioral decision theory. 76 In fact, psychologists and experimental economists have
studied some of the mistakes that Kennedy treats under the label of "false
consciousness." Behavioral decision theory assumes that these mistakes
derive from cognitive mechanisms, rather than from capitalist alienation.
Loss aversion, framing, hindsight, and other cognitive biases explain a
number of mistakes that people systematically commit in making judgments and decisions. 77 Because some of these irrational factors affect many
contracting or consumer decisions, "behavioral law and economics" advocates paternalist interventions in contract law, such as the striking down of
onerous liquidated damages clauses and warranty disclaimers and the regulation of financial markets. Unlike Kennedy, behavioral paternalists opt for
nonintrusive, noncoercive varieties of intervention. For instance, Cass Sunstein proposes "libertarian" paternalism, according to which private and
public organizations should establish arrangements that influence people's
choices in ways that will further their interests but that nonetheless leave
them free to opt out if they prefer to follow different strategies. 78 Unlike
Kennedy's paternalism, "libertarian" paternalism does not attempt to influence people's behavior by blocking free choice. For instance, "libertarian
paternalism" recommends default rules. Similarly, Colin Camerer et al.
defend "asymmetric paternalism," which promotes regulations that create
benefits for those who do not act in their best interests because of errors
that lead them astray, while letting those who act in their best interests to

73. Id. at 626-29.
74. Id. at 634.
75. Id.
76. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982).
77. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997); see
also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
78. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
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do so without interference. 79 These authors say that "a policy is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who are boundedly
rational.., while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational .... -80 Asymmetric paternalism has various applications in contract
law. The defenders of this position mention as examples default rules, provision or re-framing of information (protection of credit consumers, of
investors, etc.), cooling-off periods, and limiting consumer choices (e.g.,
deadlines to avoid procrastination).
I suggest that the contractors, even though they are aware of findings
in cognitive psychology, will adopt a narrow interpretation of the doctrine
of unconscionability for three reasons. First, contractors know that judges
and regulators will be also subject to cognitive mistakes, and that a strong
doctrine of unconscionability can be counterproductive in many ways. In
particular, policymakers (judges included) usually underestimate the risk
that their decisions will have harmful consequences, and they often are
overconfident in their ability to manipulate extremely complex social processes to achieve their goals. Regulatory miscalculation can produce tragic
outcomes because, as Gerald Gaus observes, the realm of social policy is
characterized by profound uncertainty. 8 1 This problem is only exacerbated
in the case of judges, who, because of the special features of the adversarial
process, have at their disposal very little leeway in which to implement
social policies and correct possible mistakes.
The fundamental point is that contractors are assumed to be knowledgeable in economics and social theory, so they will eschew counterproductive applications of the unconscionability doctrine. 82 Consider two
examples of counterproductive use of the unconscionability doctrine. First,
contract prices can adjust to the risks derived from a new and significant
unconscionability ruling, possibly harming the class of contracting parties
the court sought to protect. For instance, if courts start applying a very
strong doctrine of unconscionability in residential contracts, rents will increase, harming particularly the poor. Second, as with any other form of
insurance, a strong doctrine of unconscionability will be beset by moral
hazard effects. Thus, the doctrine will aggravate miscalculation and other
forms of irrationality in contracting settings. This can become a negative
79. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulationfor Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case
for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1219-23 (2003).
80. Id. at 1219.
81. Gerald F. Gaus, Why All Welfare States (IncludingLaissez-Faire Ones) Are Unreasonable,15
SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 1, 16-18 (1998).
82. In this respect, the contractarian approach strikingly contrasts with Shiffrin's hard nonconsequentialist position. See supratext accompanying note 24.
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feedback process: instead of inducing contracting parties to exert more
care, the doctrine will likely encourage irresponsibility and hence greater
dependency. Individuals will become more fallible, and this, in turn, will
83
call for more intrusive varieties of the unconscionability doctrine.
The second reason why courts will adopt a narrow doctrine of unconscionability is that, as Jeffrey J. Rachlinski has recently argued, although
people utilize heuristics that make them vulnerable to erroneous judgments,
they are also able to correct their mistakes and to restructure decision problems so as to minimize the probability of mistake.84 People can learn from
their mistakes and adapt their behavior. At the same time, says Rachlinski,
people can hire private experts, like financial planners, attorneys, and insurance agents, who can make more reliable decisions in contexts where
cognitive mistakes are common. Rachlinski concludes that if the evidence
from cognitive psychology is considered in its entirety, it does not support
invasive forms of paternalism.
Finally, interest groups could "exploit" the doctrine of unconscionability to pursue rent-seeking goals. Indeed, litigation cannot be taken as an
exogenous variable in the strategic interaction between interest groups and
government. 85 Although lifetime tenure makes federal judges less susceptible to special interests, interest groups can influence judicial decisions directly and indirectly: directly by manipulating the information that nurtures
the judicial decision-making, and indirectly by influencing the political
processes related to judicial appointments and promotions. Contractors will
seriously consider the negative side-effects of allowing the courts to transfer property via the doctrine of unconscionability. Loren Lomasky makes
this point very clearly with respect to government powers:
If the rules of the political game allow for taking and then redistributing
property just so long as a majority can be assembled to testify that they
are acting for the sake of some lofty ideal of social justice-perhaps one
83. However, Eric Posner has presented an argument that runs in the opposite direction. Assuming
a welfare state, which produces moral hazard effects, he claims that "restrictive contract doctrines," like
usury laws and unconscionability, can correct those perverse incentives by increasing the cost of credit
contracts and thus discouraging the poor to take excessive financial risks. See Eric A. Posner, Contract
Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related
Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995). 1 find this argument dubious as
applied to the unconscionability doctrine. Even if this doctrine actually raises the cost of credit, the poor
can be encouraged to take expensive loans if they can predict that the courts will nonetheless bring
interest rates on loans down to affordable levels. I believe that unconscionability might add to the
welfare state's distortions, rather than detract from them.
84. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism,97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1165 (2003).
85. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31(1991); see also Geoffrey Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT.
REV. 397 (1987), reprintedin LAW AND JUSTICE 366 (Dale A. Nance ed., 1994).
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that goes by the name of "justice as faimess"-then it is predictable that
those rules will be frequently and extravagantly bent in the service of interests that are neither impartial nor likely to advance the positions of the
least well-off. Knowing this, contractors in the original position will be
loath to afford carte blanche to the proliferation of allegedly welfarist
86
measures.
For that matter, contractors will be reluctant to frame the unconscionability doctrine so as to facilitate rent-seeking and subsidies via litigation.
A contractarian approach places strict limits to the use of the unconscionability doctrine. In general, contractors will rationally regard the presumptions of nonvoluntariness stemming from the doctrine as rebuttable
because they know that an absolute prohibition can have unpredictable
negative outcomes. For instance, contractors can authorize courts to treat
under procedural unconscionability financial contracts that use mathematical or graphic devices intended to exploit systematic cognitive mistakes
made by inexperienced contracting parties, particularly when this is conjoined with gross substantive unconscionability. But contractors will likely
obligate the courts to consider counterevidence that the contract was a rational choice given the economic or social circumstances surrounding the
87
agreement.
Would the contractors likely adopt a conclusive presumption of nonvoluntariness under any special conditions? Mill famously defends one
exception to anti-paternalism: the slavery contract. 88 Liberals often regard
the slavery contract as substantively unconscionable because the buyer
wants to obtain the seller's right to liberty, which is inalienable. Unlike
Mill and other liberals, contractarianism should treat slavery contracts in a
procedural, nonsubstantive fashion. Thus, contractors could use the concept
of "inalienable rights" as a rhetorical device to establish a conclusive presumption of nonvoluntariness. Feinberg comes close to this position when
he says, "There is, of course, always the presumption, and a very strong
one indeed, that those who elect to 'sell' themselves into slavery are either
incompetent, unfree, or misinformed." 89 However, he takes the presumption to be rebuttable: "The supposition is at least possible, therefore, that
every now and then a normal person in full possession of her or his faculties would voluntarily consent to permanent slavery." 9 0 However, I believe
86. Lomasky, supra note 59, at 191.
87. For examples of reasons that can explain seemingly unfair contractual terms, see Benjamin
Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" ContractualArrangements, in READINGS INTHE
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 139 (victor P. Goldberg ed., 1989).
88. MILL, supra note 13, at 235.
89. Feinberg, supra note 9, at 12.
90. Id.
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that from a contractarian perspective a conclusive presumption of nonvoluntariness could be justified by the name of "inalienability." 9 1 In fact, contractors might rationally relinquish their liberty to sell themselves into
slavery because they know that precommitment is a rational strategy for
boundedly rational agents. As Jon Elster points out, "[B]inding oneself is a
privileged way of resolving the problem of weakness of will; the main
technique for achieving rationality by indirect means."'92 On this view,
inalienability would be a sort of legal fiction. 93 Thus contractors might use
a precommitment strategy, under the legal fiction of "inalienable rights," in
order to protect their individual autonomy from irrational and irreparable
94
choices.
CONCLUSION

The self-regarding approach is very limited in scope and is unable to
explain why the state's responsibility is morally implicated given the parties' consent in procedurally perfect agreements. But I believe that underlying these shortcomings is a more fundamental problem. The self-regarding
theory solely looks at the substance, not the procedure of unconscionable
contracts. The contractarian approach illuminates the procedural thrust of
the doctrine of unconscionability. In liberal theory contracts can only be
illegitimate when the parties' consent is somehow vitiated. In principle,
substantive unconscionability can only be an indirect way to prove procedural unconscionability. According to the contractarian approach, even
substantive unconscionability deriving from the putative transference of
inalienable rights has at bottom a procedural rationale. This means that
"pure" substantive unconscionability is a mirage. The contractarian approach explains all these features in an elegant and parsimonious fashion.

91. Cf Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7 (proposing an alternative view, which explains inalienability in terms of negative externalities).
92. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 37
(1979).
93.

See generally LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967) (defining and explaining legal fic-

tions).
94. They could use a precommitment strategy as well to protect their political liberty via constitutional constraints. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (analyzing
constitutionalism as a form of precommitment).

